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By means of extensive computer simulations, the authors consider
the entangled coevolution of actions and social structure in a new
version of a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma model that naturally gives
way to a process of social differentiation. Diverse social roles emerge
from the dynamics of the system: leaders are individuals getting a
large payoff who are imitated by a considerable fraction of the
population, conformists are unsatisfied cooperative agents that keep
cooperating, and exploiters are defectors with a payoff larger than
the average one obtained by cooperators. The dynamics generate a
social network that can have the topology of a small world network.
The network has a strong hierarchical structure in which the leaders
play an essential role in sustaining a highly cooperative stable re-
gime. But disruptions affecting leaders produce social crises de-
scribed as dynamical cascades that propagate through the network.
INTRODUCTION
Social traps (Platt 1973) are situations in which rational individual choices
result in an undesirable collective outcome for the social group. A well-
known example is the problem of establishing cooperation in a social
1 Vı´ctor M. Eguı´luz and Maxi San Miguel acknowledge financial support from MEC
(Spain) through projects CONOCE2 and FIS2004-05073-C04-03; Martı´n G. Zimmer-
mann is thankful for financial support from FOMEC-UBA and CONICET (Argen-
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group (Axelrod 1984) or, more generally, problems of public goods (Olson
1965; Hardin 1968). Understanding collective social behavior, once in-
dividual attitudes are known, requires taking into account the interactions
among the individuals of the group and acknowledging that these inter-
actions are mediated by a network of social relations (Granovetter 1973,
1978). Such a network constitutes the social structure of the group. The
embeddedness of the interactions in the social structure (Granovetter 1985)
has been identified as an important factor in explaining the evolution of
cooperation (Macy and Skvoretz 1998). In the same way that the actions
of individuals are affected by the social network, it has been documented
that the network is not an exogenous structure but is created by individual
choices (Lazer 2001). However, there are not many specific models of
social dynamics that explicitly incorporate the concept of coevolution of
individual and network (Lazer 2001). In fact, in the long-term research
agenda posed by Macy (1991), a central point is that the structure of the
network should not be considered as given, but should be seen as variable.
Macy poses the question of how social structure might evolve in tandem
with the collective action it enables. This question goes beyond models
in which some network evolution is decoupled from the evolution of the
actions of the individuals in the group. In the context of reciprocal altruism
and the building of cooperation, this general question was implicitly con-
sidered within a game theory simulation model called the social evolution
model (SEM; Zeggelink, de Vos, and Elsas 2000; de Vos, Smaniotto, and
Elsas 2001). In this article, we address the problem of coevolution in a
version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD; Rapoport and Chammah 1965)
in which players interact through a network that adapts to the results of
the game and therefore to the actions of the players. We focus on the
resulting type of social structure (cohesive group vs. social hierarchy), as
well as on the dynamical mechanisms needed to produce the topological
properties of the network of interactions that stabilize a collective co-
operative behavior.
An important finding from our analysis—extensively based on com-
puter simulations (Zimmermann, Eguı´luz, and San Miguel 2001)—is the
emergence of a process of social differentiation together with the building-
up of a network with hierarchical relations. Starting from random part-
nership among equivalent individuals, a social structure emerges. In this
emerging structure, the topology of the network of social relations iden-
tifies individuals with different social roles: leaders, conformists, and ex-
ploiters. These roles have been spontaneously selected during the complex
tina). Direct correspondence to Maxi San Miguel, Instituto Mediterra´neo de Estudios
Avanzados, IMEDEA (CSIC-UIB), E07122, Palma de Mallorca, Spain. E-mail:
maxi@imedea.uib.es
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adaptive evolution of the social group that entails a learning process. This
social structure sustains global cooperation, with exploiters surviving in
hierarchical chains in the network. This result is at variance with other
simulation models, such as SEM, in which partner selection leads to the
formation of cohesive egalitarian clusters (Zeggelink et al. 2000; de Vos
et al. 2001): the emergence of these groups in a socially segmented pop-
ulation, with the exclusion of free riders, seems to be the basis of the
survival of cooperation in these other studies. In considering the topology
of the coevolved network that sustains cooperation, we find a hierarchical
network with an exponential connectivity distribution. Our results show
that clustering is not needed to sustain cooperation. However, the addi-
tional inclusion of local neighboring partner selection in the model gen-
erates the celebrated small world connectivity (Watts 1999a) of the
network.
From a philosophical point of view, the concept of emergence is used
in contemporary sociology in contradictory ways, its proper meaning being
debatable (Sawyer 2001). We use it here as it appears in multiagent models
of social systems (Gilbert and Conte 1965; Schelling 1978; Epstein and
Axtell 1996; Axelrod 1997). In this context, it refers, as is often the case
in the natural sciences, to complex dynamical behavior or properties that
cannot be reduced to or predicted from a detailed description of the units
that compose a system, so that the reductionist hypothesis does not imply
a constructionist one (Anderson 1972). These ideas put forward a hier-
archical structure of science in which different concepts and descriptions
are needed at different levels. The key idea is that sociology cannot be
reduced to psychology, as molecular biology is not just applied chemistry
(Anderson 1972). From this perspective, and recognizing the limitations
of game theory in describing human interactions, we learn much from a
metaphor like the PD when considering emergent properties that are not
simply linked to special features of individual human behavior.
A canonical example of emergence is the V shape of bird flocks (Sawyer
2001). The shape of the flock and the fact that a particular bird plays the
role of a leader, with other birds lining up behind it, is a nontrivial result
of simple interaction rules, but the leader is neither genetically determined
nor externally appointed. Our results parallel this example, showing how
equivalent agents confronted with the choice of an action (cooperating or
defecting) and with the possibility of choosing partners, differentiate and
acquire different roles while building up a social structure. This process
is the result of interactions among neighbors that determine an entangled
coevolution of the choice of actions and of the social network. A partic-
ularly enlightening example of the general process that we address here
is the cooperative relations among researchers in a given scientific field.
A given researcher might choose to work with or not work with another
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scientist and, depending on the degree of success of this collaboration, he
might search in the community to find other scientists with whom a
profitable cooperative relation can be alternatively established. This co-
evolution process results in a network of collaborations in which different
scientists play different roles.
Our results might be compared with other studies of group formation
beyond those associated with the SEM. In Carley’s theory of group sta-
bility (1991), as also happens in our simple model of equivalent agents,
individuals assume multiple roles. In addition, these diverse roles produce,
at the group level, group stability or change depending on the social
structure. However, while Carley’s theory is based on the sharing of
knowledge, our model is not. Stability is in our case strictly dependent
on the adapting structure of the network of interactions.
In the remainder of this introduction, we give a brief discussion of the
main components of our analysis. These components are models of co-
operation, models of social networks, and the implications of the will of
the agents that manifests itself in the ability to make choices. The second
section of the article presents our model and some general conclusions
from its analysis. The main body of our computer simulation results are
summarized in a third section. We conclude with a discussion of the results
and limitations of our study.
Routes to Cooperation
Why do people cooperate? Why is cooperation empirically observed when
there is a conflict between self-interest and the common good? Classical
answers to these questions are formulated in terms of kin (Hamilton 1964),
group selection (Wilson and Sober 1994), or cooperation based upon rec-
iprocity (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984). The
first two answers are biologically based—the former on the increased
biological fitness of kinship and the latter on the adaptive success of groups
of cooperators. However, the idea of social kin selection has also been put
forward (Riolo, Cohen, and Axelrod 2001): cooperation can arise from
similarity, and tags that identify such similarity can be based on cultural
attributes instead of being genetically determined. Indeed, cultural trans-
mission has been invoked as a potential reason for the prevalence of
cooperation in human populations (Mark 2002). Another route to coop-
eration, based on a reputation score for each individual and information
sharing (Nowak and Sigmund 1998), also emphasizes the cultural forces
present in society. Cooperation grounded on reputation can be seen, how-
ever, as a form of indirect reciprocity.
Cooperation based upon reciprocity is often formalized through the
iterated PD (Rapoport and Chammah 1965). The game theoretical for-
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mulation of the PD shows that two perfectly rational agents interacting
once and confronted with the choice of cooperating or defecting would
both choose to defect, which corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the
game. When the game is repeated or iterated, the Folk theorem classifies
the many possible outcomes that can be sustained, particularly full co-
operation. It is the shadow of the future in the repeated interaction that
makes cooperation sustainable (Axelrod 1984). Although basic concepts
and results on the PD were well known in game theory (Binmore 1998),
the evolutionary ideas for the selection of an equilibrium pioneered by
Axelrod (1984, 1997) have been extremely influential. They have lead to
the consideration of the virtue of different strategies and to the concept
of evolutionary stable strategies. It is now well accepted that dynamical
models of cultural evolution and social learning hold a greater chance for
success than models merely based on rational choice. This body of knowl-
edge has been reviewed by Hoffmann (2000), while some recent advances
in the theory have been reviewed by Axelrod (2000).
Generally speaking, locality is not taken into account in the different
studies of models of cooperation mentioned so far. Individuals or players
interact globally through continuous changes of random pairings among
them. However, local spatial interactions introduce another possibility of
reciprocity that is not based on history-dependent or backward-looking
strategies. In this line of thinking, spatial PD games have been introduced
(Axelrod 1984; Nowak and May 1992) and further generalized by Lind-
gren and Nordahl (1994). Spatial games and local interactions were also
introduced in economic contexts by Blume (1993) and Ellison (1993). No-
wak and May (1992, 1993) and Nowak, Bonhoeffer, and May (1994a,
1994b) started by considering a group of individuals placed at the nodes
of a regular two-dimensional square lattice. What they showed is that
cooperation might arise from spatially distributed interactions: if agents
play only with a local neighborhood in the lattice, clusters of cooperators
may survive the interaction with defectors, and cooperation may be sus-
tained. This can happen by bypassing any consideration of memory and
strategy, in situations when noncooperative behavior would prevail in the
global game. Admittedly, the game theory formulation of cooperation
neglects interpersonal relations driven by emotional processes (Lawler and
Yoon 1998). In spatial PD games, the fundamental relationship is that of
exchange conditioned by structural position. Still, the basic mechanism
of imitating successful neighbors is introduced. This mechanism is cer-
tainly prevalent in many human interactions. It must be pointed out that
the analysis of spatial games, especially when searching for collective
emergent behavior in societies with a large number of individuals, requires
the use of intensive computer simulations. Some analytical results, how-
ever, have been obtained (Schweitzer, Behera, and Muhlenbein 2002),
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especially in simplified one-dimensional models (Eshel, Samuelson, and
Shaked 1998).
There are other routes to cooperation, among which we can mention
optional participation (Hauert et al. 2002) and stochastic collusion (Macy
1991). Optional or volunteer participation is a mechanism that incorpo-
rates, in addition to cooperators and defectors, players (loners) that refuse
to participate in the game. This has been shown to be an effective mech-
anism to escape from the social dilemma without invoking any form of
reciprocity. Incorporating locality and spatial interactions, cooperators
also tend to fare better (Szabo and Hauert 2002). Stochastic collusion
stems from a forward-looking route to learning and adaptive behavior
(Macy and Flache 2002): stochastic search by adaptive individuals in
response to immediate outcomes allows escape from the noncooperative
social trap. The beneficial implications of locality (bounded social space)
on sustaining cooperation is another component of this mechanism (Macy
1991).
Social Networks
A new field of opportunities for modeling is opened when considering the
network of social interactions—links between individuals are not ran-
domly established, but are dependant on neighborhood or interest rela-
tionships. As a consequence, clusters and stable linkages are developed,
giving way to new aspects of cooperation in which interactions among
individuals have an important effect, as they are crucial to the perfor-
mance of the system as a whole (Holland et al. 1986).
The consideration of the spatial version of the PD discussed above is
a step in the direction of considering a social network. But a social network
is different from a regular two-dimensional lattice, just as social inter-
actions are different from a continuous random pairing of individuals.
The popular phenomenon of six degrees of separation (Guare 1990) that
follows from the early experiments of Milgram (1967) demonstrates that
if the average separation between two individuals is given by only six
intermediate acquaintances (six links), social networks radically differ
from the regular ones often considered in spatial games. Such a small
world effect has been repopularized by Watts and Strogatz (1998). Beyond
the physical and topological properties of the network, it is also important
to recall that, in economic terms, a social network has been associated
with a social capital (Coleman 1988), in the sense that it gives the basis
for stable, repeated social interactions.
The spatial version of the PD had been revisited by Axelrod and co-
workers (Axelrod 2000; Cohen, Riolo, and Axelrod 2001) in trying to
understand the role of social structure and geographically based networks
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in the maintenance of cooperation. They have shown that geographically
dispersed social networks are efficient in maintaining cooperation, pro-
vided the links are stable. They conclude, therefore, that the important
aspect is not clustering (i.e., locality or correlation of linkage patterns),
but what they label as context preservation, that is, the continuity of
interactions. Another interesting contribution in this context is the study
of Buskens and Weesie (2000) on the role of social structure in supporting
cooperation via reputation. By including a social structure, this study goes
beyond those of Nowak and May (1992) and Riolo et al. (2001), and it
shows that these two aspects—social structure and reputation—reinforce
each other in building up a cooperative collective behavior (Axelrod 2000).
Reputation established via information sharing leads to sustained coop-
eration in social structures that are less rigid than the ones fixed by geo-
graphic positions, therefore adding a higher degree of freedom.
From the early mathematical analysis of random networks (Erdos and
Renyi 1959), there is a fast-growing literature devoted to uncovering the
topological properties of technological, biological, and social networks
(Wasserman and Faust 1984; Watts and Strogatz 1998; Watts 1999a,
1999b; Barabasi and Albert 1999; Amaral et al. 2000; Newman 2001;
Newman, Strogatz, and Watts 2001), partially reviewed by Albert and
Baraba´si (2002), Baraba´si (2002), and Watts (2003). Strogatz (2001) em-
phasized that although many networks present similar characteristics, it
is important to note that differences do exist. The properties of a network
that are usually analyzed are average distance between nodes, clustering,
and degree distribution. A short average distance, that is, the fact that
the number of steps needed to connect any pair of individuals in a social
network is few, is what originally characterized a small world effect. But
it was long ago recognized (Wasserman and Faust 1984) that social net-
works also show a high tendency to form cliques, that is, that friends of
friends are also friends. Such a high clustering property and a small path
length characterize the small world networks formalized by Watts (1999a,
1999b). These small world networks are halfway between random and
regular networks. The degree distribution is the probability distribution
of the number of links or connections of a node of the network. Many
networks have a power-law distribution, which implies a scale-free dis-
tribution of degree (Barabasi and Albert 1999). However, it has been
reported (Amaral et al. 2000) that social networks do not generally display
such heterogeneity in their connectivity, but instead show a more ho-
mogeneous degree distribution, with the number of connections being
characterized by a narrow distribution around a single scale.
Our concern in this article is not the characterization of the topological
properties obtained in examining a snapshot of a social network. Rather,
the question addressed is how the network is dynamically formed or how
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a given network structure is reached after social agents interact for a long
time (Zimmermann, Eguı´luz, and San Miguel 2004). As Watts indicates
(Watts 1999a), networks affect the dynamics of the system in a passive
and an active way. Examples of the passive way are the spatial version
of the PD game and the variants thereof previously mentioned, or the
study of a PD game in small world network (Abramson and Kuperman
2001). We are here interested in the active manner in which the network
of connections evolves by the will of the agents. We seek to unveil possible
dynamic mechanisms to achieve a small world connectivity.
Making Choices and Beyond: Spontaneous Social Differentiation
Incorporating the will of the agents seems to be a crucial component of
any model of human behavior. In the setting of a spatial version of the
PD game in a social network, the agents should have some way of choosing
their actions (cooperate or defect) and choosing their partners. Making
choices is an instrument for learning in an adaptive evolution.
Partner and action selection has been taken into account in the iterated
PD as reviewed by de Vos et al. (2001), but without considering local
spatial interactions and also without reference to a social network. The
volunteering mechanism of Hauert et al. (2002) does not give a choice of
action, since agents refusing to participate are fixed from the outset, but
it is an indirect mechanism to determine who interacts with whom. More
closely related to changes in the network structure, or to the choice of
partners, is the mechanism of allowing players to exit from an unsatis-
factory relationship with partners, as discussed by Axelrod (2000) on the
grounds of the Edk-Group’s analysis of a set of 15 strategies related by
the possibility of opting out (Edk-Group 2000). The possibility of exiting
generally reinforces cooperation, but again, this study does not include
local interactions and social networks.
The formation of a social network based on individual decisions has
been studied by Bala and Goyal (2000); however, the individuals forming
the network do not have dynamics on top of the network of interactions:
there is no game mediated by the interactions defined by the network.
Skyrms and Pemantle (2000) do consider the simultaneous evolution of
actions and the structure of the network (fluid network), emphasizing that
these types of models are largely unexplored. A generic result from their
study is that important changes in global behavior occur when moving
from frozen to fluid social networks. Their approach is similar to the one
also considered by Macy (1991): starting from a random network, the
network is regenerated at each time step of the game by random pairings
among the agents, but the probability of a pairing depends on the previous
results of the game. This is a basic idea of coevolution, but it does not
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take into account aspects of locality, or a social network, that albeit evolv-
ing, has well-established, stable links among individuals.
Our starting point is the observation that the influence of social struc-
ture in human behavior, with feedback between actions and social struc-
ture, might be seen as an entangled coevolution of the choice of actions
and the formation of a social structure. Specifically, we address here the
issue of the evolution of social networks in the context of cooperation,
allowing individuals both to choose actions and to choose exiting from
unsatisfactory relationships. We propose a simple model where the actions
of individuals that form the social network are driven by their level of
satisfaction, as they choose their actions by imitation of their best neighbor.
Moreover, we introduce social plasticity—other definitions are introduced
by Lazer (2001)—as the capacity of the individuals to choose partners,
being able to change their neighborhood as time goes on. Evolving in-
teractions thus appear, allowing individuals to choose different partners
on the grounds of the obtained performance.
The significant step forward in the results of our approach is that it
naturally leads to a process of social differentiation. Starting from random
partnership among equivalent individuals, a social structure emerges. In
this emerging structure, the topology of the network of social relations
identifies individuals with different social roles. These roles have been
spontaneously selected during the complex adaptive dynamics of the social
group. They are not the direct consequence of initial differences in strategy
or location. Rather, they emerge in a probabilistic dynamic in which the
social network is constructed.
PRISONER’S DILEMMA IN AN ADAPTIVE NETWORK
The simplest form of the PD game consists of two agents that may choose
from either of two actions: to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). If both agents
choose C, each agent gets a payoff (reward) if one defects while theR;
other cooperates, the former gets a payoff T (with ), while the latterT 1 R
gets the “sucker’s” payoff S (with ); if both defect, both get a payoffS ! R
P. Under the standard restrictions , , defectionT 1 R 1 P 1 S T P ! 2R
is the best choice in a single-shot game (Nash equilibrium). Thus, the
social dilemma of how cooperation may be sustained arises, due to the
fact that rational agents would defect. When no social structure is as-
sumed, agents are drawn randomly in pairs to play the game, and the
dynamics may be described by a replicator-type equation (Hofbauer and
Sigmund 1998). This equation can be understood from the biologically
motivated fact that strategies with fitness greater than the average in the
whole population replicate with a positive rate, while those that under-
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perform compared to the average die away. In our context, if is thePC
average payoff obtained using strategy , and the average payoff forC APS
all the population, then the time evolution of the fraction of the agents
using strategy , labeled , obeys the equationC fC
dfCp f (P  APS). (1)C Cdt
Given the payoffs of the PD game we obtain
P p Rf  (1 f )S, (2)C C C
2 2APSp Rf  (S T) f (1 f ) P(1 f ) , (3)C C C C
and thus
dfC [ ]p f (1 f ) (R T) f  (S P)(1 f ) . (4)C C C Cdt
The analysis of this equation indicates that it has two equilibrium solu-
tions in is a stable fixed point, while is an unstablef  [0,1] : f p 0 f p 1C C C
fixed point. Thus, it also follows from this dynamical analysis that in the
absence of an interaction network describing a social structure, the only
stable solution is a pure defective state.
In the spatial version of the PD (Axelrod 1984; Nowak and May 1992,
1993; Nowak et al. 1994a, 1994b), agents sit on the nodes of the network
and they play the game with their neighbors. Two agents are said to be
“neighbors” if they are directly connected by a link of the network. A
detailed analysis of the different spatiotemporal patterns that can arise
in the dynamics shows a phase space where cooperators and defectors
can coexist depending on the parameter values (Schweitzer et al. 2002;
Lindgren and Nordahl 1994). There are threshold values in parameter
space beyond which defection dominates the whole network.
We will consider a spatial version of the PD, generalized in order to
consider adapting evolving networks of interaction instead of fixed, reg-
ular lattices.
Social Plasticity
We want to study how the results obtained with fixed interaction networks
change if a certain social plasticity is allowed. This term addresses the
common observation that social interactions in most societies adapt in
time by a learning process. We will implement a rule for social plasticity
that depends on both the strategies and payoffs of the individual players.
The motivation of this rule comes from the following analysis of the
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mutual benefit obtained from each pair of allowed PD interactions: two
symmetric (C–C and D–D) and one asymmetric (C–D). Clearly, the sym-
metric interaction C–C should be reinforced because both agents get the
maximum payoff from their selected strategies. However, the opposite
occurs in a D–D interaction, where both agents have aligned incentives
to change neighbors and to possibly find a C neighbor. The asymmetric
interaction C–D forms an intermediate class, where the C agent will not
support the interaction, but the D agent will try to reinforce it. As a first
approximation to the problem, we assume that this type of interaction
does not change, because the overall effect of both agents is balanced.
From this analysis, we conclude that the simplest nontrivial social plas-
ticity rule should allow interactions among two D agents to adapt, pro-
viding a self-interest mechanism of social adaptation where the agents
can increase their payoffs by changing their partners.
The Model
We consider a fixed population of agents placed in the nodes of a network
and connected by links to their neighbors. The dynamics evolve in discrete
time steps divided in three stages, starting from a random choice of strat-
egies and a random network:
1. Interacting.—Each agent i plays the PD game with its neighbors
and collects an aggregate payoff, P.
2. Strategy update.—Each agent updates its current strategy, imi-
tating the strategy of the neighbor with the largest payoff in-
cluding itself (whenever more than one equivalent neighbor with
a larger payoff exists, one of them is randomly selected).
3. Neighborhood update.—If agent i imitates a defector, then the
agent i replaces with probability p this link with the imitated D
neighbor with a new one pointing to a randomly chosen partner
from the whole network. This process updates the network.
In order to clarify the rules of the model, we would like to make the
following points. First, we specify that in the interaction step, we only
consider bidirectional (undirected) links, so if agent i plays with j, then
we also assume that j plays with i. Second, we do not consider complex
strategies which involve the history of past encounters with neighbors (as
in Lindgren and Nordahl 1994), but we consider instead only zero-memory
strategies, and assume that each agent plays the same strategy (action) C
or D with all its partners. Third, the game is played synchronously; that
is, at each discrete time step, agents decide their strategy in advance and
they all play at the same time.
We consider in figure 1 an example that illustrates the rules of the
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Fig. 1.—(a) At time step , the system is composed of cooperators (white circles )t a e
and defectors (black circle f) whose interactions are given by the links. Since the payoff
matrix is given by , , and , the payoff for each agent isPp Sp 0 Rp 1 Tp 1.3
. Therefore, the cooperator c is leader, because it has the{P ,P ,P ,P ,P ,P }p {1,2,3,2,2,2.6}a b c d e f
maximum payoff. Agents a and b get a lower payoff than their common neighbor, the
defector f. However, agent a has another neighbor c that gets an even larger payoff than
f. (b) In the next time step , a imitates cooperation from c, which has the largest payofft 1
among its neighbors, and only agent b changes strategy and imitates the D strategy from
f. The figure also shows that b broke the link with agent f and started a new interaction
with the randomly selected agent a.
model. The system is initially formed by five cooperators (agents a to e)
and one defector (agent f). According to the payoff they obtain, agents a,
d, and e are unsatisfied, and they will imitate in the next time step the
cooperator c. Agents c and f are satisfied because they do not have a
neighbor with a larger payoff. Finally, agent b is also unsatisfied, but the
agent with the largest payoff is the defector f. Thus in the next time step,
it changes its strategy to become a defector and (with probability p) breaks
the link with agent f and selects a new neighbor as partner (in this case
it selects agent a). Note that in the neighborhood update rule, it is not
necessary for an agent to change its strategy from cooperator to defector
in order to sever a link. This example shows that the neighborhood update
rule facilitates the survival of the defectors by increasing their payoff
when a cooperator is selected at random.
The strategy and neighborhood update rules implemented in this model
represent a useful device to unveil basic mechanisms behind global co-
operative behavior. Other devices are discussed later in section 4. On the
one hand, the extreme learning (imitation) rule of the strategy update can
be justified by the psychological bias to focus on confirmation and neglect
disconfirmation of beliefs (Strang and Macy 2001). Bounded rational
agents seek to learn from limited and biased information: they respond
to perceived failure by imitating their most successful peer. In our example
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of scientific collaborations, each scientist takes as a model the most suc-
cessful among his collaborators rather than, for example, alternating be-
tween imitating both successful and not-so-successful collaborators.
Regarding the neighborhood update rule, we assume first that only D–
D links are broken, and second that any targeted agent always accepts
a new partner. This rule can be justified as a conservative assumption
when considering minimal conditions for the emergence of cooperation.
As discussed in section 4, alternative rules allowing cooperators to sever
their links would further enhance cooperation. The second assumption
can be justified by invoking the absence of cost to sustain a link. Within
this assumption, the new link may only increase the payoff, never decrease
it, and thus it will always be accepted. In the context of scientific collab-
oration, if the cost to sustain a research collaboration was zero, then
scientists would accept offers from any collaborator with the expectation
of getting benefit. Beyond sustaining a link, there is a cost to establish a
new one. In our model, the plasticity parameter p measures how easy it
is both to sever a collaboration and to find a new partner. While for
this cost is extremely large (so large that it prevents the formationpp 0
of new links), for the cost is small.pp 1
Finally, although in real social dynamics one experiences both spon-
taneous creation and suppression of interactions, for simplicity, our model
assumes that unsuccessful relations are replaced by randomly selected
new ones, always leaving the total number of links constant.
Our strategy update introduces the first classification of the agents in
the network: satisfied and unsatisfied agents. An agent is satisfied if it
does not imitate any other agent, thus having the largest payoff in its
neighborhood; otherwise it is unsatisfied. Thus, strategy imitation and
social plasticity (adaptation) is restricted only to unsatisfied agents.
The probability p measures the social plasticity of the agents, controlling
the rate at which the network structure evolves, as compared to the
timescale of evolution of the strategies. For values of , strategiesp K 1
change much faster than network evolution (a situation similar to the
frozen network of ), while for , strategies and network evolvepp 0 pp 1
at the same rate (fluid social network).
Stationary States
The proposed model naturally leads to a time evolution of the local con-
nectivity of the network, featuring agents with heterogeneous neighbor-
hoods. Starting from an initial condition of random partnership with links
randomly placed among initially equivalent agents, the feedback between
choice of strategies and choice of partners results in a dynamical evolution
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from which a well-defined social structure is expected to emerge in the
form of stationary states.
In our context, a stationary state is reached when both the strategy of
each agent and its neighbors remain fixed in time. Given the discrete
nature of the dynamics and the finite number of possible states, these
states may be reached in a finite number of time steps. The simplest
stationary state consists of all agents being cooperators. Note however,
that a state composed exclusively of defectors is a stationary state only
when the network is fixed ( ); for , the agents’ strategies remainpp 0 p 1 0
fixed, while the network is continuously evolving. According to the dy-
namical rules of the model, each agent’s being a defector is not a stationary
configuration, even in the case of a social network where each agent has
the same number of neighbors (remember that in the case of several
neighbors sharing the largest payoff in the neighborhood, one of them is
picked at random). In an all-D network, only interaction links change,
but not strategies. For the sake of clarity, we will refer to this state as
the all-D network state, even if the interactions are not stationary. Our
system has a multiplicity of different stationary states, and the system is
expected to reach one of these states. This assumption is confirmed by
numerical simulations. The specific stationary state reached by the system
depends on the stochastic process that shapes the network evolution. A
proper characterization of the general properties of these stationary states
relies then on statistical tools.
Two requirements are needed for a stationary state to exist. The first
is that there be no links between two defectors, so that the neighborhood
update rule ( ) does not produce any change. The second conditionp 1 0
relates the respective payoffs in each neighborhood of any cooperator i
interacting with a D agent, say d. Their respective payoffs must satisfy
P 1 P 1 P , (5)j d i
where agent j is the cooperator imitated by i. Thus, a stable situation
occurs when the payoff of defectors is accommodated “in between” the
payoff of two cooperators, and they only exploit cooperators. Whenever
the payoff of becomes larger than the best neighbor of , the configu-d i
ration is no longer stationary, because the cooperator will switch toi
imitate the strategy of agent . Thus, in the stationary state, defectors dod
not interact with other D agents, and no cooperator imitates their strategy.
An interesting consequence of this result is that the agent with the largest
payoff is a cooperator if the system settles to a stationary state. However,
this does not prevent a defector from holding the largest payoff in a
transient state.
This simple analysis highlights the role that the “imitation of the best
neighbor,” coupled to the social plasticity rule, has in shaping the social
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structure of the system. A related consequence is that the social structure
developed becomes hierarchical in terms of payoff and dynamics, as we
will show below. One way to visualize the hierarchal structure of the
network is by constructing a subnetwork referred to as an imitation net-
work, where each directed link indicates who is imitating whom. As in
stationary states, no other agent imitates defectors; in this representation,
D agents are isolated.
Figure 2 shows part of the imitation network in a stationary configu-
ration. The agents in the outer layers imitate the ones in the inner layers:
by our previous definition they are unsatisfied agents. In a stationary
state, cooperators form trees of agents hierarchically ordered according
to their payoff. This description highlights some special agents that do
not imitate any other agent: the agent at the top of the chain has the
highest payoff of the tree to which it belongs, and it is the only agent that
is satisfied in the tree. They are easily recognized at the top of the trees.
All other agents in the tree are unsatisfied, but they imitate the same
strategy they were playing in the previous time step. An implication of
this representation is that the size of the group formed by following di-
rected links to the leader gives an indication of the influence of the leader
with respect to the rest of the system. In a stationary state, a leader has
no links to D agents. Among the leaders, there is an absolute leader defined
as the one with the largest payoff in the system. As a consequence, the
absolute leader is also the agent with the largest number of links in the
imitation network. All the links of the absolute leader are imitation links
shown in the imitation network; any other leader in the system has a
smaller number of cooperating partners. The whole system is dominated
by the few leaders that control a large fraction of the population. The
structure of the social network is then expected to be very sensitive to
perturbations acting on those leaders.
When the system is close to a stationary state (i.e., if there are a few
cooperators not satisfying eq. 5, as happens when, for example, a coop-
erator imitates a defector), then the imitation network is useful in un-
derstanding how this “perturbation” will propagate along the rest of the
social structure. Note that at each time step, the D strategy replicates on
all those agents connected to the agent where the perturbation started,
causing an “avalanche” of replication events. This chain of events may
end in an all-D network, or, because of the existence of cooperator leaders,
cooperation may recover, as we will show below.
Social Differentiation
Our previous description of the resulting stationary states also offers a
description of how our social model with network adaptation naturally
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Fig. 2.—Imitation network obtained from a numerical simulation with ,Tp 1.75 Rp
, , and . The simulation starts from a random network with1 Pp Sp 0 pp 0.10 Np
agents and a number of average links per node of the network. Agents are10,000 Kp 8
organized in imitation layers coded with the same gray level. Starting from the outer layer
of a tree, new nodes are introduced for each new link in the path to reach the leader at the
top of the tree. Each agent imitates the agent of the inner layer to which it is linked in the
tree. The network contains several trees. Three leaders ( , , and ) are identified. isL L L L0 1 2 0
the absolute leader with the largest payoff in the system. Its tree contains approximately
half the number of agents of the system. All nodes are cooperators, because defectors are
isolated in the imitation network. Most of the network’s nodes, which belong to the lowest
layer of the hierachical structure, are not shown for clarity.
gives rise to a process of social differentiation with the spontaneous emer-
gence of different social roles. Even if all the agents are driven by the
same dynamical rules and they are initially statistically equivalent, their
role in the network diversifies. Our previous analysis of the imitation
network allows us to identify three types of agents in a stationary state:
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1. Leaders.—Satisfied cooperators that have the maximum payoff in their
corresponding neighborhood. The absolute leader is the agent with the
largest payoff in the whole network, and its corresponding group of
influenced agents is in general the largest. Typically, the other leaders
have also a large number of links and a payoff above the average.
Admittedly, the sociological concept of leader has several different char-
acteristics, not all of them included in our definition. Still, we use this
term to emphasize that these are agents strongly influencing other agents
to adopt their strategy. In this context, leaders do not have the will to
seek their leadership, nor do they try to preserve it.
2. Conformists.—Unsatisfied cooperators, that is, cooperators that do not
have maximum payoff in their neighborhood, but imitate other agents
by playing their same strategy. They constitute the large majority of
the nodes of the imitation network except for the leaders.
3. Exploiters.—Defectors that take advantage of others’ actions. Defectors
have a larger payoff then their C neighbors, showing they succeed in
exploitation and are satisfied. In the imitation network, they do not
have any directed link, because in the stationary state, no other agent
imitates their strategy.
SIMULATING SOCIAL DYNAMICS
To facilitate comparison with previous results of the PD game in fixed
networks (e.g., Nowak and May 1992), we have performed numerical
simulations of the above model using as main parameters the incentive
to defect in the range and the social plasticity .b{ T 1 ! b ! 2 p  [0,1]
The rest of the PD payoff matrix parameters have been kept fixed,
, , and as in Nowak and May (1992). It has beenRp 1 Pp 0 Sp 0
previously found (Lindgren and Nordahl 1994) that turning Pp Sp 0
does not change the main results, although the single PD game is not in
the strict PD conditions. We have made sure that changing the parameter
P in the region (0, 0.1) does not significantly affect our results.
All simulations were performed with agents. The strategyNp 10,000
initial condition was always set to 60% of randomly distributed cooper-
ators. The network initial condition was set by distributing undi-KN/2
rected links between random pairs of nodes. The number correspondsK
to the average connectivity per agent, and we considered TheKp 8.
initial degree (number of links of each agent) distribution constructed in
this manner is a Poisson distribution with parameter . Simulations withK
other values parameters have been performed, and no qualitative differ-
ences were found. Likewise, we have ensured that using an asynchronous
updating in our simulations does not change any meaningful qualitative
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result. For the above parameters, a stationary state is reached in a time
scale that depends very much on , requiring about 1,000 time steps forp
and about 10 time steps for . For smaller the typicalpp 0.01 pp 1 N
time to reach a stationary state decreases, while for larger it increases.K
A proper characterization of the general properties of these stationary
states relies then on averaging over many different numerical experiments.
Our results are given as averages over 100 different experiments.
Simulations in our adaptive dynamic network game show how coop-
eration is in general enhanced, and no threshold to an all-D network is
observed. In fact, our results indicate that for a given set of parameters,
there is a coexistence of a multitude of cooperative stationary states and
the all-D network state. This means that for a fraction of the initial
conditions, the stochastic dynamics of the network may lead either to the
all-D network or to a stationary state. Once in the all-D network, the
system gets trapped, and no recovery is possible (remember that an in an
all-D state the interaction links change, but not the strategies). The prob-
ability of reaching the trapping all-D network decreases as the number
of agents increases (it also decreases as the incentive to defect decreasesb
and the initial distribution of cooperators increases), and thus the trap
appears to be a finite size effect. For instance, for an incentive to defect
and plasticity , only 6% of the realizations get trappedbp 1.6 pp 0.01
for a large population , while for , 80% get trapped.Np 10,000 Np 1,000
Here we concentrate on stationary states where cooperators coexist with
defectors.
Fraction of Cooperators
Figure 3 shows a first global characterization of the stationary states for
different values of the parameter and the incentive to defect . Thep b
fraction of cooperators, , is measured for a fixed network andf (pp 0)C
is shown to decrease with , approaching zero at a threshold value ofb
. Thus, context preservation (Cohen et al. 2001) without socialb  1.85
plasticity provides partial cooperation. In clear contrast, for positive ,p
social plasticity facilitates the establishment of a highly cooperative state
with a fraction of cooperators essentially independent of the incentive to
defect . Even for small plasticity , the fraction of cooperators is aboveb p
90% in the range of parameter considered. A similar result is obtainedb
for other values of the average connectivity In this sense, contextK 1 2.
preservation is not a necessary condition to build up cooperation, but
rather the social structure is a consequence of an adaptive dynamics in
which cooperation is greatly enhanced.
It is worth mentioning that the result of enhanced cooperation works
against the direct effects of the neighborhood adaptation rule, introduced
Fig. 3.—Average fraction of cooperative agents, , for different values of the plasticity p and incentive to defect, b. For a fixed network ( ),f pp 0C
decreases with b. However, in the presence of social plasticity , is kept above 90%.f (p( 0) fC C
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to facilitate the survival of defectors. Defectors are allowed to find new
cooperators to exploit, exiting from unsatisfactory interactions with other
defectors. However, the final outcome is that the number of defectors
decreases. It seems that successful defectors become isolated because they
are role models: their victims “run away.” The new defectors—those that
imitated successful defectors—establish links with cooperators that have
a high concentration of other cooperators in their neighborhoods. Thus,
the formerly exploited cooperators, now defectors, turn again into coop-
erators. To achieve cooperation, it seems that cooperators need enough
cooperator partners to have a payoff higher than any defector. This hy-
pothesis is analyzed in the following sections.
Distribution of Cooperators’ and Defectors’ Payoffs
The total average payoff is larger in the dynamic network than(p( 0)
for a frozen network . However, we have measured systematic(pp 0)
differences when considering the average payoffs and for each ofP PD C
the respective subpopulations D and C. While the number of cooperators
is larger, their average payoff is smaller than that of the defectors, re-
versing the situation of a frozen network (see fig. 4). The payoff distri-
bution in a stationary state for each subpopulation is shown in the inset
of figure 4 for a particular value of . This graph shows that the mostb
probable payoff is larger for defectors, also explaining the larger average
payoff of the defectors. However, close inspection reveals that the distri-
bution for cooperators always has a larger tail, indicating that a number
of cooperators have a payoff larger than any other defector in the network.
Most of these agents are leaders and are necessary for a cooperative
stationary state to exist.
Thus, the main characteristic of our adaptive social game is that an
altruistic social network, that is, a network composed of a large number
of cooperators, may develop with a few defectors that have a large average
payoff. The neighborhoods of the agents adapt to conform to the require-
ments of the stationary states (D agents only interact with cooperators),
and the cooperator with the largest payoff in each branch of the imitation
network corresponds to a “leader” with a payoff much larger than the
average, whose strategy all other agents imitate.
Transient Dynamics, Leaders, and Social Crisis
The evolution toward a stationary state is typically not a smooth, mo-
notonous buildup of a globally cooperating state. Starting from a random
initial condition, the transient dynamics are characterized by small fluc-
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Fig. 4.—Difference between the average payoff of defectors, , and cooperators,AP SD
, as a function of b for (stars) and (squares). The effect of the socialAP S pp 0 pp 0.10C
plasticity is that the defectors get a larger payoff on average: is positive forAP P SD C
. Inset: probability distribution (normalized to each subpopulation) of individual pay-p( 0
off, for cooperators (solid line) and defectors (dotted line). The most probable payoff, which
corresponds to the maximum of the distribution, is larger for defectors than for cooperators.
However, there are a few cooperators getting the largest payoff in the population, as is seen
in the tails of the distribution for large values of P. Parameter values , .bp 1.75 pp 0.1
tuations and distinctive, large oscillations in the proportion of cooperators
as a function of time that can be understood in terms of social crisis.
An example of a frustrated attempt to build cooperation is the evolution
of the proportion of cooperators shown in figure 5. Starting from a non-
stationary state of low cooperation in the initial fixed random network
for , network dynamics then lead to a social network with a hight ! 200
degree of cooperation after several large oscillations in the time interval
. The large oscillations in are frustrated attempts to build220 ! t ! 300 fC
cooperation. They indicate that the defecting behavior is so rewarding
that the cooperation has to find a specific network configuration in order
to be robust against eventual changes of strategy. In such a configuration,
the most connected agent (the one that has the largest number of links)
in the imitation network is also the one with the largest payoff. In the
Fig. 5.—Time series for the fraction of cooperators for . The evolution is in a fixed random network ( ) up to time whenf bp 1.7 pp 0 tp 200C
network dynamics are switched on, so that for . At time the network leader is forced to change action from C to D, to showpp 1 t 1 200 tp 500
how cooperation may recover after a social crisis. After an oscillatory transient, a new stationary state is reached. Below, snapshots of the instantaneous
configurations of actions are shown at the indicated times. A white (black) point is a C (D) agent in a node of the network (links are not shown). The
spatial location of the agents does not have any meaning because of the building of a network of interactions. It is only used for display purposes.
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frustrated attempts to reach a global stationary cooperative state, the
proportion of cooperators becomes large. A few time steps before reachesfC
each maxima, a cooperator receives a new link from a defector with a
larger payoff and switches to D strategy, starting a social crisis. Given
that at those time steps there is a large proportion of cooperators in the
network, an avalanche of D-strategy imitation starts. This avalanche will
certainly affect the neighbors of a cooperator leader, thus decreasing the
payoff of most leaders. Precisely when the avalanche begins, there is a
defector with a payoff larger than the absolute cooperative leader. The
social crisis propogates through most of the system, producing a change
in the connectivity of the social network (Zimmermann et al. 2001). The
initial distribution of links for the C and D populations are Poisson dis-
tributions around the average connectivity, typical of random networks.
At a local maximum of , the two distributions have exponential tails forfC
large values of links. Then, very rapidly, the network switches to the
almost defective solution with a large number of D–D links and Poissonian
degree distributions. However, the existence of a small number of coop-
erators with a large payoff permits, thanks to the plasticity of the network,
the gradual buildup of cooperation by creating C–C links. This requires
two steps. First, D–C links are created (initiated by the defectors), and
then the defectors imitate the more successful cooperator in a later stage.
Finally, in the stationary state, the distribution of links for the D popu-
lation becomes very narrow, while the distribution for the C population
displays a tail approaching an exponential decay. The stationary network
configuration is thus dominated by a few cooperators—the leaders—with
a large number of links (the tails of the distribution of links for cooper-
ators). These highly connected agents dominate the collective behavior of
the network.
These characteristic dynamics reveal the functional property of C lead-
ers; on the one hand, through the imitation process, they sustain coop-
eration, while on the other, they enhance cooperation whenever the C
leader has the largest payoff of the whole network. In fact, there is a sort
of competition between the leader and the defector with the largest payoff.
We remark that the latter process is due to social plasticity: whenever a
defector selects a leader for partnership, there is a great probability that
the leader has a larger payoff and the defector will imitate cooperation,
enhancing the number of cooperators.
Figure 5 also illustrates the sensitivity of the stationary network struc-
ture to exogenous perturbations acting on the leaders, which reflects their
key role in sustaining cooperation. At time the system alreadytp 500,
has reached a stationary state. However, at this time step, we have forced
a strategy switch of the cooperative absolute leader, leading once again
to a social crisis similar to the one previously described in the endogenous
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dynamics. In summary, the system self-organizes into one of several pos-
sible cooperative states where avalanches and social crises are likely to
occur following spontaneous, focused local perturbations.
Structure of the Social Network
A first characterization of the topology of the stationary network reached
by the dynamics is given by the degree distribution, that is, the probability
distribution of the number of links of a node. This distribution has aK
long tail that distinguishes it from the Poisson distribution of the random
network. This is reflected in the values of the normalized standard de-
viation shown in figure 6 for different values of and . Wej p j/K p bn
recall that for a Poisson distribution, , while for an exponential1/2j p Kn
distribution . We find that for small values of , the distributionj p 1 bn
departs significantly from the Poisson distribution only for large values
of the plasticity parameter p, while for increasing b, the tail of the dis-
tribution expands and approaches an exponential form. In other words,
the hierarchical structure of the network is accentuated as increases,b
with fewer leaders that have a larger payoff.
The distribution of payoffs (inset of fig. 4) is similar to the degree
distribution because that payoff of the cooperators is given by the number
of links with other cooperators, and there is a very small number of
defectors in the stationary state. Therefore, the variations of also pro-jn
vide a measure of social inequality in the network. In fact, is closelyjn
related to the Gini coefficient (Kakwani 1980) used in the characterization
of economic inequalities in a social group. We have measured the Gini
coefficient of the resulting network configuration in a stationary state and
found that it can be twice as large as one of a random (Poissonian dis-
tribution) network. Social plasticity generates a flux of payoff toward
richer individuals.
Finally, we address the question of whether the social structure gen-
erated in our dynamical model has the characteristics of a small world
network. Two requirements have to be fulfilled: the clustering (or cliqu-
ishness) has to be much larger than in a random network, and the average
path length between two nodes should be similar to that of a correspond-
ing random network. The clustering coefficient, , measures the fractionc
of neighbors of a node that are connected among them, averaged over
all the nodes in the network. Most very complex networks show a clus-
tering larger than in random networks given by (Amaral etc p K/Nrand
al. 2000). In our original formulation, numerical simulations show (fig. 7)
that for increasing the clustering coefficient increases very slightly withb
respect to the clustering of a fixed random network (i.e., may changec/crand
up to 1.06). We have tested a slight enhancement of the network adap-
Fig. 6.—Normalized standard deviation of the degree distribution of the social networks obtained for different values of the plasticity parameterjn
p and the incentive to defect b. For a Poisson distribution and , , while for an exponential distribution, . For ,0.5Kp 8 j p K p 0.35 j p 1 pp 0n n
takes the value of a Poisson distribution. As p and b are increased, the interaction network departs from a Poisson distribution and approaches ajn
distribution with an exponential tail.
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Fig. 7.—Normalized clustering coefficient , with . Filled circles corre-c/c c p K/Nrand rand
spond to and . Other curves are for and (diamonds),pp 1 qp 0 qp 0.01 pp 0.01 pp
(squares), and (empty circles). Social plasticity ( ) and a local selection of0.1 pp 1 p( 0
new partners ( ) are needed in order to reproduce the clustering observed in socialq( 0
networks.
tation which easily accounts for high clustering. Very often, new acquain-
tances are made based on the relationships of current neighbors. To im-
plement this idea, the social neighborhood adaptation step of our original
formulation was augmented: if a neighbor is replaced by a new one with
probability , a local selection of a new partner happens among the neigh-q
bors of the neighbors, while with probability , the previous random1 q
selection is performed. The limiting case corresponds to our originalqp 0
formulation, while corresponds to the case that all the new partnersqp 1
are chosen from the neighbor’s neighbors. It is natural that this new
mechanism will increase the clustering. Numerical simulations show that
while most of our previously discussed results are qualitatively indepen-
dent of the value of , with a very small value of , the clustering coefficientq q
becomes very large. For instance, 1% of local partner selection is enough
to increase 100 times, being the clustering largest for a slow evolutionc
of the network . As for the second requirement for small world(p K 1)
topology, we find that the average path length remains in all cases very
close to that of a random network. Together, our results indicate that,
allowing for local partner selection, the social network generated in our
adaptive dynamics has the structure of a small world network.
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DISCUSSION
We have presented a minimal model that incorporates simultaneous and
coupled evolution (coevolution) of the strategies of the agents and of the
social network, providing a first step in the investigation of the processes
of social differentiation in a globally cooperating social group. Different
agents play different social roles that are acquired through social inter-
action and are not externally imposed or determined by genetic mecha-
nisms. Rather, the roles emerge from the self-organizing dynamics of the
complex system. It is important to note that the initial differences in
number of links among the agents do not determine the final roles of each
agent, since each agent temporarily changes its role in the stochastic dy-
namics until a final stationary state is reached. Moreover, we have made
sure—provided the initial condition of a random network in which each
agent has the same number of links—that the system dynamics lead to
the same emergent role differentiation.
Our results indicate that cooperation is stabilized by a hierarchical self-
organized structure, so that the formation of cohesive clusters of coop-
erators with the exclusion of free riders is unnecessary for persistent global
cooperation. Allowing for local partner selection, this self-organization
leads from a random network to a final social network with the topology
of a small world network, demonstrating how small world connectivity,
in which clustering is larger than in a random network, can be dynamically
achieved.
Our study reveals that if defectors have the ability to choose partners—
breaking interactions with other defectors—the number of cooperators
increases, but the average payoff of cooperators is less than that of greedy
agents. The dynamics naturally generate leaders—individuals getting a
large payoff that are imitated by a considerable fraction of the population,
conformists—unsatisfied cooperative agents that keep cooperating, and
exploiters—defectors with a payoff larger than the average obtained by
cooperators. The most prominent role is the one of leader, a cooperator
that not only sustains cooperation, but also drives the whole system to-
ward more cooperation. Defectors are found to remain stable whenever
they exploit cooperators. The formation of a social hierarchy in the pop-
ulation is the source of possible unstable behavior. It promotes the oc-
currence of social crisis that can affect a large fraction of the population.
These crises take the form of global cascades that might be easily triggered
by the spontaneous change in action of a highly connected agent. This
result highlights the importance of highly connected agents that, as il-
lustrated by the imitation network, play a leadership role in the collective
dynamics of the system. Such sensitivity of the network stability to local
special perturbations reveals an interesting feature of globalization: the
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group of agents organizes itself into a state where an exogenous or sto-
chastic perturbation may produce drastic changes, at distance, within a
limited time period.
Even though our model has many interesting features, the strategy and
neighborhood update rules represent an extreme and conservative choice
of rules. Thus, it would be important to investigate how the modification
of the model rules affects the results reported here. Some of the points
that may merit further research in connection with our strategy update
and network update rules are outlined in the remainder of this article.
Starting with our strategy update rule, we note that an important as-
sumption made in our model is that the satisfaction of an agent is de-
termined by comparison of absolute payoffs. Taking into account the
evolution of the social interaction, this assumption implies that two neigh-
bors might have different payoffs because they have a different number
of neighbors. On the one hand, this assumption highlights the importance
of being highly connected. On the other hand, basing a comparison on
the relative payoff per neighbor implies that each agent knows how many
neighbors each of its neighbors has. Additionally, our strategy update rule
is an extreme “copy best” rule, while alternatives like probabilistic imi-
tation of better role models (Schlag and Pollock 1999) or probabilistic
selection of neighbors’ strategy (Nowak and May 1993) could also be
considered.
For the network update rule, we note that, in our model, only links
between two defectors can be broken. In a stationary state, most coop-
erators are unsatisfied because they imitate an agent with a larger payoff.
In our model, this unsatisfactory situation does not induce action to im-
prove payoff beyond the imitation of a neighbor in the social network.
One way to test the implications of this hypothesis would be to modify
the network update rule, letting the C–C link also be broken. For example,
we could let cooperators have some probability of changing a D neighbor
with a random agent. In this setting, cooperation would be further en-
hanced, and the occurrence of large social crises could be limited. Thus,
our rule for neighborhood update assures in particular that the highly
successful defectors will not be abandoned by the cooperators whose ex-
ploitation has made them so successful. Hence, we make defection an
attractive option in that exploited agents cannot simply leave their ex-
ploiter because of, for example, changed costs of relationship or some
(semi-)rational calculation of the expected benefit of creating new ties. A
related point is that one could question why D–D links cannot be broken
except for those that involve an unsatisfied agent. We have in fact assumed
that only agents having at least one neighbor with higher payoff are
“forced” to do something to improve their payoff. Thus, we assume some
kind of “aversion to change”: one will do something only when one is not
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satisfied, otherwise one will do nothing. This rule can be justified by the
cost implicit in the change of a social relation, and it allows, in principle,
the maintenance of interaction between two defectors as long as they are
both satisfied.
There is another point that deserves further investigation and that
relates both to the strategy and network update rules: our choice of strat-
egy update is based on the aggregate payoff, while our justification of the
network adaptation rule is based on comparison of individual actions.
This a priori assumption involves two different mechanisms, and it is
clear that our choice is one among several possibilities. We have already
mentioned a strategy update (Nowak and May 1993) based on probabi-
listic selection among the neighbors’ strategies weighted by the aggregate
payoff. Cohen et al. (2001) compares different such mechanisms on fixed
networks. On the other hand, fewer results are known about network
update mechanisms. In the economics literature, a common rule is that
a link between two economic agents is accepted if both agents improve
their payoff (Jackson and Watts 2002; Bala and Goyal 2000). It would
be interesting to test new strategy and network adaptations involving a
more sophisticated evaluation of the strategy of the opponent and its
aggregate payoff. One possible way would be to contemplate a more
complex strategy space, involving strategies dependent on past encounters.
Work in this direction with a fixed social network was initiated by Lind-
gren and Nordahl (1994). Another interesting variable to consider is no-
nequivalent agents that may differ in their attractiveness as exchange
partners. Flache (2001) has incorporated this situation in a model that
combines the agents’ decisions about cooperation with the decisions about
selection of new partners. This also resulted in a process of social differ-
entiation sustaining cooperation. It is unclear how much of the process
of social differentiation originates in the unequally attractive agents or in
the simpler mechanisms contained in our model.
Beyond our update rules, the addition of random perturbations in strat-
egy and network is also a very relevant feature to be explored in the
future. These perturbations may originate from errors in imitation or
payoff determination, for example. Based on our results, we can see that
strategy perturbations may cause large social crises, especially if a well-
connected agent makes an error.
We finally remark that many situations in human societies follow the
dynamic scheme considered here—new collaborations are frequently
formed, while other long-lasting partnerships die out. From scientific col-
laboration to sports teams—not to mention political parties—our study
offers an example of a simple mechanism by which leadership and other
social roles might appear and consolidate.
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